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Abstract 
· Skill transfer is a fundamental feature in the domain of skill acquisition, however 
different theories present conflicting ideas regarding prediction of transfer. 
Anderson's (1982) Adaptive Control of Thought theory posits that the amount of 
transfer is proportional to the number of shared productions. Logan's (1988) Instance 
theory in contrast, posits that complete transfer will only occur on tasks which have 
been experienced before. However, work by Speelman and Kirsner (1997), Speelman, 
Forbes and Giesen (2004) and Johnson (2005) have produced results that counter the 
implicit assumptions of these theories. More specifically a disruption from the 
predicted learning curve was found in situations where both Logan and Anderson 
would predict complete transfer. Such findings have implications on the theoretical 
nature of skill acquisition. However these findings involved data that was averaged 
over many trials, and as such a more specific trial by trial account of the underlying 
nature of this disruption is not known. 
Keywords: Contextual Effects, Adaptive Control of Thought, Instance Theory, Skill 
Acquisition, Transfer. 
Matthew J. Parkinson 
Associate Prof. Craig Speelman 
29111 of October, 2007 
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Introduction 
It is a widely accepted notion that as an individual practises a given task their 
perfo1mance on the task will improve; that is, the amount of time taken to perform the 
task or the number of errors made during the task will decrease (Anderson, 1982; 
Fitts, 1964: Fitts & Posner, 1967; Logan, 1988). This process is usually described as 
skill acquisition and has featured heavily in recent research (Sohn, Doane & Garrison, 
2006; Taatgen & Wallach, 2002; VanLehn, 1996). Of related interest to research on 
skill acquisition is skill transfer; the degree to which a skill acquired in one situation 
can assist a task in another situation. 
Previous experiments with sldll acquisition and transfer have led to a number 
of theories that try to account for the notion of improved performance as well as skill 
transfer. The two main theories that seek to explain sldll acquisition are Anderson's 
Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT*) theory and Logan's Instance theory (Anderson, 
1982, 1983, 1987, 1993, 1992; Logan, 1988, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002). While these 
two theories approach the concept of skill acquisition differently, both theories 
implicitly suggest that when old skills are carried out in the context of a new task, 
performance will continue undisrupted. Howev.er, work by Speelman and Kirsner 
(2001) and Speelman, Forbes and Giesen (2004) has produced evidence counter to 
this assumption. 
Although the results of Speelman and his colleagues suggest that perfo1mance 
on a task might be disrupted when individuals encounter a contextual change, the 
research designs of these studies were such that other possible causes might exist for 
the disruption. As such Johnson (2005) carried out further research that ruled out 
these other possibilities. While Johnson's study confirmed that a change in context 
can disrupt skilled performance, some questions remain as to the nature of this effect. 
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The current review examines some of the features of this effect to determine its 
underlying nature. 
Skill Acquisition 
Skill acquisition, the process by which a novice progresses into an expert, is 
often described by Fitts and Posner's ( 1967) sequential stage model. In this model, an 
individual works through three stages. The first stage is known as the Cognitive stage 
and describes an individual's new attempts at a given task. In this stage the individual 
is attempting to identify and develop the crude skills needed to carry out the task. 
Therefore performance is at its slowest and the number of errors made is at their 
highest. Attentional resources are also at their peak. 
After the initial cognitive stage, practise leads to the associative stage. During 
this stage, errors in the task are detected and reduced, and appropriate or successful 
aspects of the task are strengthened, resulting in faster and more accurate ability on 
the task (Fitts & Posner, 1967). 
The last stage is the autonomous stage and it is here that the individual is now 
so adept at the task that the performance is automatic and unconscious. That is, the 
task uses minimal attentional resources. In this stage the individual's performance 
may look effortless; however at such a level, improvement on the task is minimal and 
may even be asymptotic. 
One of the earliest and often cited exemplar of the effects of practise is 
Crossman's (1959) cigar rolling study. In this study, Crossman measured the speed of 
production in workers who were making Cuban cigars using special hand operated 
machines. Crossman found that the worker's performance increased progressively for 
the first two years, which rnughly conesponded to three million trials, before levelling 
off. While performance levelled off at this point, slight improvements were still being 
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It was also noted that this asymptotic point cmTesponded to the cyclic rate of 
machines and thus it was postulated that the levelling of performance might have 
due to the limit of the machines rather than the limit of learning. However even 
machine did not have such a limit, perforn1ance will still eventually reach 
... �,·�·· - levels as the human body has physical limits and cannot complete a task in 
This description of improvement in performance was subsequently found 
a range of differing tasks such as the solving of geometry proofs (Anderson, 
Greeno, Kline, & Neves, 1981) and reading of inverted text (Kolers, 197 5). Given the 
breadth of tasks and the continual finding of such a pattern of improvement, this 
laws (Logan, 1988; Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981). This law is usually known as the 
power law of learning or the power law of practise because if the performance on a 
task is plotted as a function of the amount of practise on a task, the amount of 
improvement decreases according to a power function (see Figure 1). 
30000 -
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Figure 1. Illustration of skill acquisition data with a power curve fitted (Speelman & 
Kirsner, 2005). 
This power law can be summarised by the equation T = a+ bNc. In this 
equation T represents the amount of time taken to complete the task, a is the 
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asymptote, b is the total amount that can be learned, or put another way, the difference 
between the time on the first trial and the asymptote, N is the amount of practise, and 
c is the learning rate. This learning rate falls between zero and negative one, with 
values closer to negative one indicating a rapid rate of learning. 
While power functions have been shown to fit the data well, there has been 
some question over their universal application, as the majority of evidence regarding 
the power law has been attained using averaged data (Heathcote, Brown, & Mewhort, 
2000). Moreover there is evidence that when individual data are plotted as opposed to 
averaged data, an exponential function provides a much better fit than does a power 
function (Heathcote et al., 2000). While it has been suggested that exponential 
functions best approximate what is happening during learning, Heathcote et al. accept 
that power functions may be useful for revealing general trends about the nature of 
skill acquisition. 
Anderson's ACT* Themy 
Currently, one of the dominant theories of skill acquisition is Anderson's 
(1982, 1983, 1987, 1993, 1992) Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT*) theory. 
According to Anderson, behaviour is governed. through the use of production rules. 
Production rules are condition-action or if-then statements that provide information on 
how to respond to a given situation. An example of a simple production rule would 
be: 
IF the goal is to form the present participle of a verb 
THEN add '-ing' to the verb 
A production rule has two parts, the IF component being a particular goal or 
task that the individual has, and the THEN component essentially being the memory 
that the individual has and utilises in the attainment of their goal. While the goal in 
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the example can be considered simple as only one production rule would be needed to 
attain it, Anderson notes that more complex goals may need the use of several 
production rules to reach the goal. 
Like Fitts and Posner's (1967) model, in Anderson's theory people move 
through three stages as they progress from a novice to a skilled person on a particular 
task. The first stage is the declarative stage and it corresponds to Fitts and Posner' s 
cognitive stage. This stage represents an individual's beginnings with a task whereby 
the individual encodes knowledge in a declarative form from explicit facts or 
instructions regarding the task, or by using a problem solving strategy such as analogy 
from prior experience. 
The second stage is the knowledge compilation stage and conesponds with 
Fitts and Posner's associative stage. During this stage knowledge in the declarative 
form is compiled into a procedural form through the use of productions. It is 
throughout this stage that a task can be undertaken with less reliance on interpretive 
procedures (Anderson, 1982). 
Finally there is the procedural stage which corresponds to Fitts and Posner' s 
autonomous stage. During this stage the individual is considered proficient at the skill 
and performance becomes more automatic with less demand on attentional resources. 
While the three stages of skill acquisition in ACT are similar to those 
described by Fitts and Posner, Anderson expands on the earlier account by suggesting 
three ways that explain how practise improves task performance; namely rule 
composition, strengthening and proceduralisation. 
When an individual first practises a task they will use explicit instructions or 
other crude ways of approximating the task; but with further practise they will 
develop productions. This process of proceduralisation involves slower declarative 
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information being transformed into faster and more efficient procedural information 
(productions). Improvement in performance is partly attributed to this process as an 
individual can use more specific productions from long term memory, rather then 
having to hold onto large amounts of declarative information in working memory, 
resulting in less conscious cognitive effort and faster reaction times. 
A particular task may require a number of productions before the goal is 
reached, however with enough practise the individual can collapse some of these 
productions together, reducing the number of productions needed to reach the goal, 
and thus create a more efficient and quicker strategy. 
An example of the composition process is provided below. This example 
comes from Speelman and Mayberry (1998), and is designed to illustrate the 
development of an algebra skill. 
(PI) 
(P2) 
(P3) 
(P4) 
IF 
THEN 
IF 
THEN 
IF 
THEN 
IF 
THEN 
goal is to solve for x in equation of the form a = bx + c 
set as subgoal to isolate x on RBS of equation. 
goal is to isolate x on RBS of equation 
set as subgoal to eliminate c from RBS of equation. 
goal is to eliminate c from RBS of equation 
add-c to both sides of the equation. 
goal is to solve for x in the equation and it has been isolated on the 
RBS of the equation 
LBS of equation is solution for x. 
If an individual practises many equations of the form a = bx + c, then composition 
will result, with productions 2 and 3 being collapsed into: 
If goal is to isolate x on RHS of the equation 
THEN add -c to both sides of the equation. 
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If practise is continued, productions I, 4 and 5 would be collapsed to produce the 
more efficient production rule: 
IF goal is to solve x in the equation a = x +c 
THEN subtract c from a to form the solution. 
Consequently, the original goal is now accomplished in one step as opposed to the 
original five, reducing the workload and resulting in faster reaction times for the task. 
Lastly performance is enhanced due to strengthening, as, according to 
Anderson, every time a declarative fact or production rule is applied it becomes 
stronger. Strength in the ACT theory pertains to the probability that a given 
production rule or declarative fact will be utilised. Anderson also designated 
numerical values to indicate the strength of a particular production. Using ACT a new 
production has a starting value of 0.1 and has an additive value of 0.025 each time it 
is successfully employed. However if the production is applied unsuccessfully, its 
value is reduced multiplicatively by 0.25, meaning the application of incorrect 
productions has a stronger effect then correctly applied productions. Thus while these 
numbers are somewhat arbitrarily chosen by Anderson, they do provide an 
explanation of how errors in performance are reduced (Anderson, 1982). 
Logan 's Instance ThemJ1 
A second fundamental theory of skill acquisition is Logan's (1988, 1990, 
1995, 1998, 2002) instance theory. The core tenet in this theory is that individuals 
become better at tasks, not because of various qualitative changes, as is posited in 
Anderson's theory, but due to an increase in memory traces known as instances. 
Contextual Effects 1 0  
In this theory, there are three underlying assumptions. The first assumption is 
that encoding of a memory trace- is an obligatory and unavoidable consequence of 
attending to a stimulus. However this does not mean that it will necessarily be 
retrieved, only that the encoding will be obligatory. Logan's second assumption states 
that what information is available regarding a given stimulus will be retrieved from 
memory as an unavoidable consequence of attention. Lastly the theory assumes that 
every encounter with a stimulus is encoded, stored and retrieved separately. 
According to this theory, when an individual is first presented with a novel 
task, they will try and complete the task using a general algorithm. For example a 
child who is asked to add 8 and 2 may use their fingers or crude knowledge of 
counting to work out the answer. Once the task has been completed, an 'instance' ,  
which comprises of both the solution and the task, is encoded into memory. 
According to Logan, the next time the same task is encountered, the individual will 
again begin to solve the problem using the general algorithm, while simultaneously 
retrieving an instance. The response that produces the solution the fastest is used. 
With additional exposure to the same task, the number of instances available increases 
while the speed of the algorithm remains at a constant. The more instances there are, 
the more likely one of them will be faster then the algorithm and therefore the more 
likely an instance will be executed over the algorithm. 
It is tlu·ough this metaphorical 'race' between the algorithm and instances that 
Logan is able to explain the speed-up of performance that is associated with practise; 
whereby an individual gradually shifts from using the general algorithm to using 
instances accessed directly from memory. Indeed Logan views automaticity as 
performance on a task in which the individual no longer has to use the algorithm, but 
instead relies entirely on instances. 
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Skill Transfer 
Given the underlying explanations of how skills are acquired, both Logan and 
Anderson make quite specific predictions on the transfer of these skills. Skill transfer 
refers to the amount to which a skill that is acquired in one setting aids in the 
execution or acquisition of a skill in a different situation (Greig & Speelman, 1999). 
To examine transfer researchers typically present people with a number of trials on a 
given task called the training phase, and plot their performance graphically. They will 
then give the same group of people another task, usually referred to as the transfer 
phase, and again plot their performance. The transfer phase can then be compared to 
the training phase or to a different group of people who did not do the original 
training phase to examine if transfer occurred. 
Generally speaking there are three types of transfer; positive, patiial and zero 
transfer. Complete transfer is said to have occurred if perfo1mance in the transfer 
phase, once plotted, continues in line with what would be predicted from the power 
function that describes the training leaming curve. Essentially this means that 
performance on the new task is identical or near identical with performance on the last 
part of the training phase. Partial transfer is seen when transfer performance is better 
then initial performance on the training phase, but is not as advanced as performance 
at the end of training. This means that the training phase has helped the individual in 
perfmming the new task, but not to the point where they can carry out the new task as 
efficiently as the training task. Lastly there is zero transfer, which occurs when 
performance on the transfer phase is similar to what is seen at the initial part of the 
training stage. Essentially this means that the individual has experienced no gain in 
performance from being exposed to the prior task. 
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While it is these three types of transfer that are generally seen when examining 
the notion of transfer, a study by Luchins (1942) suggests that negative transfer is 
possible. Negative transfer is said to have occurred when performance on a task is 
hindered through exposure from a previous task. The most well known example of 
this is lmown as the Einstellung effect in which participants were given a number of 
water jug problems to solve. Luchins found that participants would continue to solve 
the problems using the same successful strategy, even when a simpler and more 
efficient solution could be used. While this phenomenon is generally labelled as 
negative transfer, Anderson (1987) suggested this may be an example of positive 
transfer of a less efficient skill. 
Both Anderson's ACT and Logan's instance theory make quite specific yet 
different predictions about the workings of transfer. The key difference between the 
two theories centres on how specific or how general they can be. According to 
Anderson, the amount of transfer that occurs can be accounted for by the number of 
shared productions two tasks share. If two tasks share a significant number of 
productions then partial transfer is likely and complete transfer is possible. According 
to Anderson even if two tasks share a small number of productions, partial transfer is 
still likely. In this way ACT is :flexible and can account for the whole range of transfer 
outcomes, from zero to complete transfer of two tasks. 
This was highlighted in a study by Speelman and Kirsner ( 1997) who 
examined the role of transfer using syllogistic reasoning on 128 university students. 
For this task, participants were to answer either true or false to universal affirmative 
syllogisms such as: 
All of the Artists are Bee keepers 
All of the Beekeepers are Chemists 
Therefore 
All of the Artists are Chemists 
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For the training phase participants were presented with 288 such syllogisms, 
whereby the first two premises were presented on a computer screen, and once the 
participant had pressed ' ready', they would disappear and a conclusion would then be 
presented. The participant was then to answer true or false to the given conclusion. 
While all of the syllogisms were of the same structure and could be solved 
using the same type of strategy, none of the syllogisms were repeated. Thus in terms 
of transfer prediction, Anderson's ACT and Logan's instance theory make quite 
different predictions. For Logan, as no syllogism was repeated, there should be no 
transfer as there are no prior instances to employ. As the instance theory asse1is that 
the algorithm does not improve performance, reaction times and the number of errors 
should be similar in both the training and transfer conditions (Speelman & Kirsner, 
1997). 
However according to the ACT theory, there is likely to be transfer as while 
no syllogisms were repeated, they all shared a similar form and thus it was highly 
likely that all syllogisms were solved with common productions. As such these 
underlying productions will be refined and strengthened leading to an increase in 
performance. Indeed the results revealed that b0th complete and partial transfer was 
shown, supporting ACT while revealing a fundamental problem with instance theory. 
While in this study many similarities existed between the two tasks, according 
to ACT, it is not their similarity so much, but their shared productions which is central 
in the role of transfer. This was highlighted by Singley and Anderson (1989) who 
showed that zero transfer can occur between tasks that are superficially quite similar. 
Essentially this means that while two tasks may seem to appear quite similar, transfer 
may be small as they may not share productions. However this abstract notion of 
productions has been a criticism of the ACT theory as it makes the theory vitiually 
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impossible to falsify (Carlson & Schneider, 1989). Indeed Anderson (1987) himself 
was aware that being able to predict the amount of transfer is not an easy task as 
individuals can not verbalise any underlying productions while engaging in a task. 
While Anderson's ACT theory is quite broad with its account of transfer, in 
contrast Logan's instance theory is more restrictive. According to Logan, an instance 
is highly specific to the experiences encountered. As a result no transfer will occur 
unless the transfer task is identical to the training task. This is because in this theory 
the individual has no stored information or 'instances' on a task that is different, and 
consequently their performance will be as error prone and as slow on the task as if 
they had never been exposed to the training task. However should the transfer task be 
identical in nature to the training task, then complete transfer should occur whereby 
the individual's performance should be the same or slightly better than their previous 
exposure. Therefore Logan posits a dichotomous view of transfer where partial 
transfer can not occur, only complete or zero transfer is possible. 
The role of transfer in the instance theory can be highlighted through a study 
by Logan and Klapp ( 1991) that was conducted to examine the role of extended 
practise on automaticity. For this study Logan and Klapp presented individuals with a 
number of alphabet-arithmetic equations such as A +  2 = C, to which the participants 
were to answer if the equation was true or false. To answer such a task, participants 
were to count forward or backwards a given number of spaces in the alphabet (i.e., 2) 
from the letter given (i.e., A). To examine the effects of transfer in this experiment 
Logan and Klapp gave the participants equations that used one half of the alphabet for 
the training phase, and then employed the other half of the alphabet for the transfer 
phase. 
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The results revealed that, as predicted by the instance theory, the more trials 
the participants were exposed to, the faster they were at answering the equations. 
According to Logan and Klapp, this is because the participants almost ce1tainly would 
have needed to use a general algorithm when first presented with such novel 
questions, but as more instances were created with increased exposure, the 
participants were relying more on memory to produce their answer, rather then having 
to go through the laborious task of manually working out the correct response. Indeed 
when they asked participants how they arrived at their answers for the first session, 
over 90% reported that they used counting. More importantly, when the paiticipants 
were presented with the other half of the alphabet that they had not yet been exposed 
to, reaction times increased significantly and performance times returned to levels 
similar to the initial sessions of the training phase. Also, participants revealed that 
they went back to counting 85% of the time, results that according to Logan show that 
transfer is item specific. 
Further support for item specific transfer came from Lassaline and Logan 
(1993) who conducted a spatial-numerosity task. For this experiment Lassaline and 
Logan presented participants with 6 - 1 1  elements on a computer screen and asked 
them to count the number of elements as quickly as possible while also being as 
accurate as possible. Throughout the initial sessions reaction times increased in a 
linear fashion as the number of elements increased, suggesting that participants were 
using the general algorithm of counting to generate a response. However as the 
particular stimuli were repeated, and so the number of practise sessions increased, the 
participant's reaction times to the different number of elements was becoming more 
homogenous, suggesting that there was a shift from the general algorithm of counting, 
to memory recaU (i.e., participants recognised the stimuli and remembered their 
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answer). Furthermore when the participants were presented with the transfer task, 
which was the same task but with different patterns, reaction times were found to 
increase with numerosity and performance times in general were comparable to the 
training phase, highlighting the item specific nature of transfer as described by the 
instance theory. 
Counter Research 
While Speelman and Kirsner's (1997) research supp01is the ACT theory, other 
research results are counter to both Anderson's and Logan's. Speelman and Kirsner 
(2001) examined whether performance during a transfer task could be predicted on 
the basis of perf01mance from a training task. To investigate this, they gave 
participants a fictional water analysis problem which could be solved by simple 
arithmetic. The training phase of this task involved three components, while the 
transfer phase used the exact same initial three components plus two new components 
of a similar nature. The participants were randomly divided into two groups and only 
the experimental group experienced the two novel components while the control 
group were presented with the same components for both the training and transfer 
phases. Each component was separate and the layout was such that each component 
was to be solved sequentially. 
Speelman and Kirsner' s (2001) experiment was designed to test a fundamental 
and implicit notion of both ACT and instance theory, which is that performance of old 
skills will continue in line with the power law of learning, even when contextual 
features are changed. As the experiment was only measuring performance on the three 
components in the transfer phase, the additional two components should have no 
bearing on performance. Indeed according to Anderson's ACT, as the exact same 
components were being used and measured, the productions and processes employed 
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would be the same resulting in complete transfer. Similarly Logan's instm1ce theory 
would predict complete transfer as participants would be able to employ instances that 
were created during the training task to solve the problems on the transfer task. 
However, the results revealed that when the experimental group began the 
transfer phase, their performance on the initial three components was slowed and 
disrupted, rather then following the predicted path of the power law. Even though the 
three components in both the training and transfer phase were identical, the results 
suggest that when the context is altered (in this case by two additional novel 
components) this can affect an individual's performance. While it should be noted 
that only performance times were disrupted, and not accuracy, the evidence of partial 
transfer instead of complete transfer is counter to what ACT and instance theory 
would predict. 
While Speelman and Kirsner' s (2001 )  research suggests that the context of a 
task may affect predictions using the power curve, other possibilities needed to be 
considered. One possible reason for the disruption in transfer could stem from the 
visual differences between the training and transfer phase (Forbes, 2000; Speelman, 
Forbes & Giesen, 2004). Given that the training phase used three components and the 
transfer phase used five, the visual appearance of these two conditions is considerably 
different. This can be highlighted in Figure 2, where there are a greater number of 
components in each section of Data, Equations and Results. This means that there is 
more information for the participants to process, and perhaps leading the participants 
to think that the transfer task had now become more complex, even though the initial 
three components stayed the same for both training and transfer (Speelman, Forbes & 
Giesen, 2004). At a bare minimum, the participants might have thought it was 
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necessary to check whether the new information required examining before 
continuing (Forbes, 2000). 
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Figure 2. A comparison of Speelman and Kirsner ' s  (2001) three and five component 
task. 
Since visual complexity might have been a confounding factor in the results 
produced by Speelman and Kirsner (2001), Speelman, Forbes and Giesen (2004) 
designed an experiment whereby the items in both the training and transfer phases 
were visually the same in appearance .  To achieve this, participants were given simple 
multiplication problems from the six times table fiJr the training phase such as 6x3 = 
_. These same multiplication problems were also used for the transfer task, however 
randomly interspersed with these problems were distractor problems that were of a 
similar nature to the target questions but differed slightly in form; for example 6x_ = 
18 . 
More importantly, only one question at a time was presented on the screen and 
each question was presented separately from each other. This meant that the visual 
appearance of both the training and the transfer phases were the same, controlling for 
the possible confounding variable that was present in Speelman and Kirsner' s (200 l )  
study. As only th.e mult�plication problems were being measured in the transfer phase, 
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if a disruption in performance was found during this phase then it suggests that 
contextual change, rather then visual complexity is possibly the cause of the transfer 
disruption. 
The results revealed that there was a disruption in performance on target 
problems at the begim1ing of the transfer phase, similar to what was found in 
Speelman and Kirsner's (2001 )  study. Given that visual differences have been ruled 
out, Speelman et al. (2000) concluded that the disruption was caused by this 
contextual change. Thus these findings challenge the implicit assumption in both 
Anderson and Logan's theories that performance of old tasks will continue to improve 
according to the power curve. 
However while this experiment does eliminate the possibility of visual 
complexity, it is possible that another interpretation apaii from contextual differences 
could result from such a design. Given that the transfer phase of the experiment used 
the exact same problems as the training phase as well as additional distractor tasks, 
the items in the transfer phase are now spaced further apa1i than those in the training 
phase. As such it is also possible that the participant's disruption in performance times 
is a reflection of memory decay, rather then an effect of contextual changes. That is, 
during transfer, when a distractor problem is presented, because it is relatively 
unfamiliar compared with the target problems, participants could take longer to solve 
them. As a result, some time passes before the next target problem is presented, which 
could result in some form of decay in whatever memory representation that is 
responsible for skilled performance (i.e., productions or instances); leading to a 
slower performance time on the next target problem. 
While the results of a contextual change impacting performance would be 
contradictory to both Anderson's and Logan's theories, the findings by Speelman and 
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Kirsner (2001)  and Speelman, Forbes and Giesen (2004) are such that other 
interpretations of the data are possible. This led to an experiment by Johnson (2005) 
in which both the visual differences and the issue of spacing were addressed. 
Johnson's design used the same multiplication problems from the six times table as 
used by Speelman, Forbes and Giesen (2004) for both the training and transfer task. 
However in Johnson's study, every trial in both the training and transfer phases 
consisted of two components; namely a target problem and a distractor problem. 
As such the participant would first be presented with a multiplication problem 
of the form 6 x 3 = _, to which they were instructed to press the space bar once they 
had thought of the answer. Two potential answers were then presented and the 
participant was required to select the correct answer. After this, they would be asked 
to add or subtract a given number from the co1rect answer. A trial in this experiment, 
then, was a multiplication problem and an addition/subtraction problem. Both the 
training and transfer phases of this experiment consisted of 12  blocks of 6 trials each. 
The exact same multiplication problems were used in both the training and 
transfer phases, with half of the participants receiving addition distractor questions for 
the training phase, with subtraction distractor questions for the transfer phase, and 
vice versa for the other participants for counterbalancing. With this design, the 
problems of visual differences and unequal spacing is avoided as both the training and 
transfer phases have the same number of items in them, and each problem is presented 
one at a time. 
The results of this study confirmed what Speelman and Kirsner (2001)  and 
Speelman Forbes and Giesen (2004) found with their studies, as Johnson (2005) 
found that the first block of transfer was significantly slower then the last block of the 
training phase (See figure 3). 
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Figure 3 .  The disruption of transfer performance from predicated values as reported 
by Johnson (2005). 
While Johnson's  study solidifies the notion that contextual changes can disrupt 
performance, it is not known how this effect is distributed on a trial by trial basis 
within the disrupted block. Such research would help to elucidate the nature of the 
disruption as well as the effect contextual changes have on a learnt task. The results 
may also be info1mative with regard to how the theories of Anderson and Logan could 
be modified to cope with the disruption associated with context change. 
One possibility is that the effect of the dismption is isolated to the first 
multiplication trial after the contextual change, with performance regaining its 
predicted path by the next trial. While this would sti ll be an issue for both the ACT 
and instance theories, it could be explained by Logan and Anderson perhaps as an 
isolated ' surprise' effect, whereby the participant is momentari ly distracted by such a 
change before regaining mental clarity on the task. A second possibility is that the 
disruption is not 'isolated, but is spread out more broadly across the trials, with 
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performance slowly regaining the predicted path. This possibility would present a 
greater challenge to both the ACT and instance theories, as it suggests a more 
systematic disrnption rather then a surprise effect. 
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Running head: CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS ON A WELL LEARNED TASK 
Contextual Effects on a Well Learned Task: Isolated or Broad? 
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Abstract 
The present study examined the role of skill acquisition and skill transfer in relation to 
both Anderson's (1982) Adaptive Control of Thought theory and Logan's (1988) 
instance theory. The study involved 59 participants being presented with 
multiplication problems from the six times table, followed by a distractor task in the 
form of an addition or subtraction question. The training phase consisted of 12 blocks 
of trials, with six trials per block. The multiplication problems remained constant in 
both the training and transfer phases, while participants receiving addition problems 
in training then received subtraction questions in transfer and vice versa. Only 
reaction times for the multiplication problems were analysed and the results showed 
that there was a significant disrnption when the participants encountered the transfer 
phase. Further analysis on a trial by trial basis indicated that in the three trials 
following the contextual change, performance was significantly slower than the first 
trial of the transfer phase, discounting a fleeting 'surprise' effect. A power function 
fitted to the reaction times of the transfer trials following the context change 
supported the gradual return of performance to pre-transfer levels. The results 
contradicted both Anderson's and Logan's predictions, and suggest that with practise, 
a mental set is developed which can then be disrupted through contextual change. 
Keywords :  Contextual Effects, Adaptive Control of Thought, Instance Theory, Skill 
Acquisition, Transfer. 
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Introduction 
The process through whieh an individual acquires new skills and becomes 
more efficient at those skills with practise is known as sldll acquisition (Anderson, 
1982; Fitts & Posner, 1967; Logan, 1988). Closely related to this is skill transfer, 
which refers to the degree to which a skill that is learned in one situation, can aid in 
the acquisition or performance of a task in a different situation. 
Previous research on both skill acquisition and skill transfer has resulted in a 
number of theories that seek to explain and conceptualise the understandings of 
improved performance and skill transfer. The two most prominent theories of skill 
acquisition and transfer are Anderson's ACT theory (Anderson, 1982, 1983,  1987, 
1992, 1993) and Logan's instance theory (Logan, 1988, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002). 
While both theories differ in their theoretical approach to sldll acquisition, they both 
share the implicit assumption that performance will continue to improve smoothly 
with practise, even when executed in the context of a new task. However research by 
Speelman and Kirsner (2001 )  and Speelman, Forbes and Giesen (2004) produced 
results that question this implicit assumption. 
While Speelman and his colleagues presented evidence which suggested 
performance on a task may be disrupted when an individual encounters contextual 
change, the designs of these studies made it possible for other interpretations of what 
may be causing the disruption in performance. This led to a study by Johnson (2005) 
that ruled out other such interpretations. 
However, while Johnson's study confirmed that a change in context can 
disrupt skilled performance, some questions remain as to the nature of this effect. 
Thus the current study was designed to examine some of the features of this effect to 
determine its underlying nature 
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Skill Acquisition 
The process of skill acquisition, through which a beginner progresses into a 
skilled expert, is often described by Fitts and Posner's (1967) sequential stage model. 
In this model, an individual progress through three stages. The first stage is known as 
the cognitive stage and describes an individual's new attempts at a given task. In this 
stage the individual is attempting to identify and develop the crude skills needed to 
can-y out the task. Therefore performance is at its slowest and the number of errors 
made is at their highest. Attentional resources are also at their peak. 
After the initial cognitive stage, further practise leads to the associative stage. 
During this stage, e1Tors in the task are detected and reduced, and appropriate or 
successful aspects of the task are strengthened, resulting in faster and more accurate 
performance on the task (Fitts & Posner, 1967). Lastly, with further practise the 
individual progresses into the autonomous stage. At this stage the individual's skill 
level is at its highest, and performance on the task is considered automatic. While 
their performance is at a high level, improvement beyond this point is minimal. 
The effect of practise on perfmmance is highlighted by an early and now 
classic study on skill acquisition conducted by Crossman (1959). In this study, 
Crossman measured the speed of production of workers who were making Cuban 
cigars using special hand operated machines. Crossman found that the worker's 
performance increased progressively for the first two years, which roughly 
corresponded to three million trials, before levelling off. While performance levelled 
off at this point, small improvements were still being made. An asymptotic point in 
the learning curve was also observed, and this corresponded to the cyclic rate of the 
machines and thus it was postulated that the levelling of performance might have been 
due to the limit of the niachines rather than the limit of learning. However even if the 
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machine did not have such a limit, perfonnance would still eventually reach 
asymptotic levels as the human hody has physical limits and cannot complete a task in 
zero seconds. 
This progression of improvement was not only found on the cigar making 
task. Other studies have rep01ied this pattern across a range of diverse tasks such as 
the reading of inve1ied text (Kolers, 1975) and the solving of geometry proofs 
(Anderson, Greeno, Kline, & Neves, 1981) . As this pattern ofimprovement was 
continually found across a large range of tasks, it was granted the status of a law in 
Psychology in a discipline where only a small number of laws exist (Logan, 1 988 ;  
Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981) . This law is named the power law of learning or the 
power law of practise because when performance is plotted as a function of practise 
on a task, improvement decreases in line with a power function. This is highlighted in 
Figure 1 .  
.Amount of Practice 
Figure I .  Representation of the power law of learning. 
Contextual Effects 32 
The power law can be summarised by the equation T = a +  bNc. In this 
equation T represents the amount of time taken to complete the task, a is the 
asymptote, b is the total amount that can be learned, or put another way, the difference 
between the time on the first trial and the asymptote, N is the amount of practise, and 
c is the learning rate. This learning rate typically falls between zero and negative one, 
with values closer to negative one indicating a rapid rate of learning. 
It should be noted that learning curves typically display asymptotes only when 
practise on a task has extended over very long periods. When practise extends over a 
sh01i period, power functions with asymptotes equal to zero (i.e, T = bNc) provide a 
good fit to the learning curve (Anderson, 1982). 
Anderson 's ACT* The01y 
The most prominent theory on skill acquisition is Anderson's (1982, 1983, 
1987, 1992, 1993) Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT*) theory. According to 
Anderson, behaviour is governed through the use of production rules. These 
production rules are condition-action or if-then statements that provide information on 
how to respond to a given situation. An example of a simple production rule would 
be: 
IF the goal is to form the past tense of a verb 
THEN add 'ed' to the verb 
Production rules have two parts, the first being the IF component which is a 
particular goal that the individual has, and the second is the THEN component which 
is essentially the memory that the individual has and uses in the attainment of their 
goal. While the goal in the example is simple in nature as only one production rule 
was needed to attain it, Anderson notes that more complex goals may need the use of 
several production rules to attain the goal. 
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As in Fitts and Posner' s ( 1967) model, Anderson proposes that people move 
through three stages as they progress from a novice to an expert on a particular task. 
The first stage is the declarative stage and it is here that the individual encodes 
knowledge in a declarative form from explicit facts or through the use of problem 
solving strategies such as analogies from prior experience. The second stage known as 
the knowledge compilation stage involves knowledge in declarative form being 
compiled into a procedural form through the use of productions. In this stage tasks 
can be undertaken with less dependence on interpretive procedures (Anderson, 1982). 
Lastly there is the procedural stage where proficiency on the task is at its highest and 
performance can be executed with the use of minimal attentional resources. 
While Anderson's model is similar to the three stage model posited by Fitts 
and Posner, Anderson expands their work by suggesting three ways in which practise 
improves performance on a task; namely proceduralisation, rule composition, 
strengthening. 
When an individual first practises a task, explicit instructions or other crude 
ways of approximating the task will be employed. However through a process known 
as proceduralisation, the slow process of applying declarative information is 
transformed into a faster and more efficient process of applying procedural 
information (productions). As a result of this process, an individual can use more 
specific productions from long te1m memory, rather than having to hold onto large 
amounts of declarative info1mation in working memory, resulting in less conscious 
cognitive effort and faster reaction times. 
Ce1iain tasks may also require the execution of a number of productions 
before the goal is attained. However with enough practise some of the productions 
can be collapsed, known as rule composition, which results in a reduced number of 
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productions being needed to reach the goal, and thus creating a more efficient and 
faster strategy. 
Performance is also improved due to strengthening. According to Anderson, 
every time a declarative fact or production rule is applied it becomes stronger. Under 
the ACT* theory, strength denotes the probability that a given production rule or 
declarative fact will be employed. When a production is utilised successfully, it gains 
strength additively, however when unsuccessfully applied its strength is reduced 
multiplicatively. In this way the application of incorrect productions has a stronger 
effect then correctly applied productions, and this provides an explanation of how 
en-ors in performance are reduced (Anderson, 1982). 
Logan 's Instance The01y 
Another central theory of skill acquisition is Logan' s (1988, 1990, 1995, 1998, 
2002) instance theory. This theory states that performance improves because of 
increases in memory traces known as instances. In this way, Logan is positing a more 
quantitative approach to sldll improvement, as opposed to Anderson's theory which 
states that improvement in a skill is due to more qualitative aspects. 
This theory rests on three underlying assumptions; namely that (1) encoding of 
a memory trace is an obligatory and unavoidable consequence of attending to a 
stimulus (2) what information is available regarding a given stimulus will be retrieved 
from memory as an unavoidable consequence of attention (3) that every encounter 
with a stimulus is encoded, stored and retrieved separately. 
According to the instance theory, when an individual first encounters a new 
task, they attempt to complete the task through the use of crude knowledge and 
strategies known in this theory as a general algorithm. Once the required goal has 
been met, an 'instance', which comprises both the task problem and the solution, are 
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stored in memory. The next time the person is exposed to the same task, they will 
again attempt to solve the problem using the genal algorithm, while simultaneously 
retrieving an instance (i.e., they will try to remember what they did the last time). 
Whichever response produces the solution the fastest is employed. 
With further exposure to the same task, the number of instances available 
increases while the speed of the algorithm remains at a constant. As the number of 
instances increases, it is more likely one of them will be retrieved faster than the 
execution of the algorithm, and therefore it is more likely an instance will be 
employed over the algorithm. It is through this metaphorical 'race' between the 
algorithm and instances that Logan is able to explain the speed-up of performance that 
is associated with practise. 
Skill Transfer 
Both Logan and Anderson's theories give specific predictions regarding the 
transfer of such skills. Skill transfer refers to the amount to which a skill that is 
acquired in one setting will aid in the execution or acquisition of a skill in a different 
situation (Greig & Speelman, 1999). 
To examine transfer, researchers typically present people with a number of 
trials on a training task, and plot their perfo1mance graphically. They will then present 
another task known as the transfer phase to the same group of people, and again plot 
their performance. The transfer phase can then be compared to performance in the 
training phase, or to a different group of people who did not do the original training 
phase to examine if transfer occurred. 
Generally speaking three types of transfer exist; complete, partial and zero 
transfer. When plotted, if performance in the transfer phase continues in line with 
what would be predicted from the power function that describes the training learning 
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curve, complete transfer is said to have occurred. Partial transfer occurs when transfer 
performance is better than perfo1mance at the beginning of training, but not as fast as 
is seen at the end of the training phase. This suggests that the training task has aided 
the learning of the transfer task to some extent. 
Finally, zero transfer is said to have occuffed when transfer performance 
resembles that of training performance. That is, initial transfer perf01mance is as slow 
as initial training performance. Thus, no gain has been made from being exposed to 
the training task. While these tlu·ee types of transfer comprise the most often reported 
forms of transfer, negative transfer has been reported, whereby the training task has a 
negative effect on the perf01mance of the transfer task (Luchins, 1942). However it is 
possible this might be positive transfer of a less proficient skill (Anderson, 1987). 
The ACT* and instance theories make quite different, yet specific predictions 
regarding the nature of transfer. In particular, the two theories differ in how broadly 
they can account for transfer. According to ACT* theory, as transfer is governed by 
the number of shared productions, the more productions two tasks have in common, 
the greater the transfer will be. According to Anderson, even if two tasks share only a 
small number of productions, partial transfer is -likely. This is in contrast to Logan's 
Instance theory, whereby no transfer will occur unless the training task and transfer 
task are identical. This is because, according to instance theory, if no 'instances' are 
stored the individual has no stored inf01mation to use on the transfer task, and their 
performance will be as slow and inaccurate as it would be had they never been 
exposed to the training task. In this way, the instance theory has a more narrow view 
of transfer, where ACT* is able to account for a greater range of transfer outcomes. 
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Counter Research 
A study conducted by Speelman and Kirsner (2001) examined whether 
performance on a transfer task can be predicted from the performance on a training 
task. To examine this they developed a fictional water analysis task in which various 
water quality questions could be solved by participants on a computer using simple 
arithmetic. The experiment consisted of a training phase and a transfer phase. The 
training phase involved solving three independent problems, while the transfer phase 
consisted of the same three problems plus the addition of two new problems. The 
participants were randomly divided into two groups and only the experimental group 
were given the two novel components, while the control group were presented with 
the same components for both the training and transfer phases. 
In this way, Speelman and Kirsner could examine an implicit assumption 
contained in both the ACT* theory and Instance theory, in which the performance of a 
well learned skill will continue to follow the power law of learning when in the 
context of a new task. Given that the experiment was only examining the pe1formance 
speed with the three components in the transfer task, and excluded the two additional 
components, performance times should continue in line with the power function that 
described the training learning curve. Anderson's ACT theory would predict complete 
transfer, given that both the training and transfer tasks share identical productions. 
Logan's instance theory would also predict complete transfer, as the participants can 
utilise the instances which were developed in the training task with the transfer task. 
However, the results indicated that when the experimental group continued 
into the transfer phase, their performance was disrupted and deviated from the 
predicted path of the power function. Thus, although the training and transfer tasks 
were being meas1;1red on the three identical task components, the results suggest that 
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context change can affect performance on an old skill. This is in direct contrast to 
both the ACT and instance theory, both of which would predict complete transfer and 
a continuation of the learning curve without disrnption. 
While these results suggest that contextual change is responsible for creating a 
disruption in a well leamed task, other interpretations of the data are possible. One 
possibility for the disruption posited by Speelman, Forbes and Giesen (2004) relates 
to the differences in visual complexity between the two phases. As can be seen in 
Figure 2, when an individual encountered the training phase, they are presented with 
additional components. 
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Figure 2. A screenshot of the three and five component task used in Speelman and 
Kirsner' s (2001 )  experiment. 
The differences in the visual appearance between the two versions of the task 
may represent a possible confound. In the transfer version of the task the participants 
now have more information to process, and this may lead them to believe that the 
transfer task is more complex then the training task, delaying their reactions. 
To rule out visual complexity as a confi.mnding factor, Speelman, Forbes and 
Giesen (2004) created an experiment where both the training and transfer phases 
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where visually identical. To do this, participants were asked to solve simple 
multiplication problems which were taken from the six times table such as 6x2 = _. 
The transfer phase then consisted of those identical questions, with additional 
distractor problems of the form 6x_ = 12, randomly dispersed throughout. The 
questions were presented one at a time both in the training phase and the transfer 
phase, creating identical visual appearances and controlling for the possible 
confounding factor of visual complexity. Given that visual differences have been 
controlled for, and that only the multiplication problems were being analysed for both 
the training and transfer phases, if a disruption is present then it would suggest 
contextual change may be the cause of such a disruption. 
When the Speelman et al. (2004) results were analysed a disruption was 
present. Therefore, with visual differences controlled for, contextual change appears 
to be sufficient to cause disruption. However another possible explanation for the 
result exists that could account for the data which centred around memory decay. 
While the transfer phase used the same items as were used during the training phase, 
the transfer phase also included a number of distractor items. As a result, the problems 
that the participants were exposed to during the .training task are now presented with a 
greater average time in between repetitions. It could be argued that a reduction in 
perfmmance on these items could be a result of memory decay, rather then a 
contextual effect. 
This led to an experimental design by Johnson (2005) which controlled for 
both the issue of visual complexity as well as memory decay. Johnson's experiment 
was similar in nature to what was used in Speelman, Forbes and Giesen's (2004) 
experiment, in which participants were asked problems from the six times table. 
However in this qesign, participants were presented with a multiplication problem, 
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which was then followed by a distractor problem in both the training and transfer 
phases. That is, when a patiicipant began the task, a multiplication problem such as 
6x8 = _ would appear on the screen, to which they were to press the spacebar once 
they have worked out their answer. Two possible answers, one correct and one 
incon·ect would appear in the bottom corners, and the participant was to the select 
their answer. Following this, the participants were instructed to either add or subtract 
a given number from the correct answer. This was the distractor task, and again once 
the participant had thought of their answer, they were to press the space bar and then 
choose from two possible answers. 
A combination of a multiplication problem and an addition/subtraction 
problem were together known as a trial, and six such trials were analysed as a block. 
Both the training phase and transfer phase consisted of 12 blocks, with half the 
patiicipants being presented with addition problems in the training phase and the other 
half receiving subtraction problems. For the transfer phase, the distractor task was 
swapped, so those that received addition problems now received subtraction problems 
and vice versa. 
As the same multiplication problems were presented in both the training and 
transfer phases, as well as both phases being composed of the same number of items, 
the issues of visual complexity and memory decay were controlled for in Johnson's 
(2005) study. The results of the study however, still supp01ied the findings of 
Speelman and Kirsner (2001) and Speelman Forbes and Giesen (2004). That is, there 
was a disruption in performance times when the participants encountered the context 
change (Figure 3) 
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Figure 3. The disrnption of transfer performance from predicated values as reported 
by Johnson (2005). 
While Johnson's  (2005) results provide strong evidence that contextual 
changes can significantly disrupt performance, the analysis of the disruption like those 
of Speelman and colleagues, focussed on mean reaction times at a block level. As a 
result, it is not known how this disruption is distributed on a trial by trial basis. Such 
research would enlighten the characteristics of disrupted performance due to 
contextual change, and may also be beneficial in respect to how Anderson and 
Logan' s theories could be adapted to accommodate such findings. 
Two broad possibilities exist as to the trial by trial nature of the disruption. 
Firstly the disruption may be isolated to the first multiplication trial foJiowing the 
contextual change, with performance returning to its predicted path by the very next 
trial. Such a result, while still contradictory to both the ACT and instance theory, 
could perhaps be accounted for by Logan and Anderson merely as a 'surprise' effect 
in which the pat1icipant .is briefly distracted before gaining focus again. 
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The second possibility is that the disruption is broader in scope, and 
participants may require a number of trials before performance returns to its predicted 
path. Should this occur, both ACT and instance theory would be presented with a 
greater issue as the disruption could not be discounted as a fleeting 'surprise' effect. 
As such, the aim of the present study was to build upon the findings of Jolmson's 
(2005) study, firstly by replicating the experiment, and secondly by examining how 
the disruption is distributed on a trial by trial basis. 
Participants 
I 
Method 
A total of 59 participants took part in the experiment, with 18 of the 
participants being recruiting from the school of psychology volunteers list, and the 
remaining 41 were from the general public. Those who were recruited through the 
school of psychology were given a raffle ticket to go into a $50.00 draw as an 
incentive. The participants were aged from 18-65 (M= 36.19, SD = 15.24) of which 
19 were male (M= 39.00 years, SD = 16.11), and 40 were female (M= 34.82, SD = 
14.82). 
Design 
The study employed a within-subjects design and examined the effect of 
context change on performance speed. Context change involved the change from 
addition problems to subtraction problems or vice versa for the second paii of each 
trial. This change occurred after the paiiicipant had completed 12 blocks of trials (also 
known as the training phase). 
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Materials 
A Power Macintosh G4 computer with the program Superlab was used to 
present stimuli and record response times. Each participant completed the task 
separately in a quiet room, with the task taking approximately 5-10 minutes to 
complete. 
Procedure 
This study was viewed and given approval by the Faculty of Computing, 
Health and Science Ethics Committee at Edith Cowan University. 
When the participant began the taslc they were firstly asked a multiplication 
problem which was presented in the middle of the screen. The multiplication problem 
was randomly selected from one of six problems, and were identical to those used by 
Johnson (2005); namely 6 x 2, 6 x 3, 6 x 4, 6 x 7, 6 x 8 and 6 x 9. Once they had 
worked out the answer they were to then press the space bar as quickly as possible. 
Two possible answers then appeared on the screen; one in each of the bottom 
corners. The participant was to then press one of two keys on the keyboard as quickly 
as possible which were highlighted with coloured stickers to make them more salient. 
The ' z' key on the bottom left of the keyboard con-esponded to the answer on the 
bottom left of the screen, and the '/' key corresponded to the answer on the bottom 
right of the screen. The words 'correct' or ' incorrect' appeared on the screen 
following the participant's response. 
The participant was required to remember the correct answer as they were then 
asked either to add or subtract a given number to it. This was the distractor task. 
Again this followed the design of Johnson's study and the six possible numbers that 
the participants were presented with included, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. While the 
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multiplication problem was always presented first, both the multiplication and 
addition/subtraction problems for- each trial were selected randomly. 
The combination of a target problem and distractor problem was known as a 
trial and six such trials constituted a block. For the training phase 12 blocks were 
presented. The transfer phase consisted of two blocks of the same design, however if 
the patticipant was given addition problems in the training phase, they were now 
given subtraction problems and vice versa. Half the participants were given addition 
problems as the distractor task while the other half were given subtraction problems 
for counterbalancing purposes .  
Results 
Reaction time was the dependent variable and was measured in milliseconds. 
Only correctly answered target problems were used and both the time taken to press 
the space-bar and select the correct response was used in the analysis. Only 
participants who had an accuracy rate of 80% or greater were included in the analysis. 
For each participant, a mean reaction time was calculated for each block. For 
each block, an overall mean reaction time across all participants was calculated. This 
was then plotted to examine whether a power function of the form T bNC, would 
provide a good fit to the data. The parameters of the best fit power function arc 
provided in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Parameters of the power function fitted to the reaction times of the Training data. 
Parameters Goodness of fit 
4. 1 0  -0 .25 0.94 0.13 
Note: nnsd = root mean squared deviation. 
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This best fit power function was then plotted with the training data and 
extrapolated into the two blocks of the transfer phase (See Figure 4). The power 
fw1ction fitted the data well, as is shown by the small root mean squared deviation 
(rmsd) value and large R2 value. 
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Figure 4. Mean reaction times for each block with a power function fitted. 
It is also visually evident that there is a disruption in performance speed for 
block 1 3 . This is suppo1icd by examining the 95% confidence interval bars for the 
two blocks in transfer in relation to the predicted learning curve. 
To examine whether this disruption between block 12 and 13 was significant, 
a paired samples t-test was conducted. The results showed that block 1 2  (M = 2 .23 
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seconds, SD = 0.93 seconds) was significantly faster than block 1 3  (M = 2.48 seconds, 
SD = 0.96 seconds), t(58) = 3 . l  7� p <.05 . 
Given this finding, further analysis was performed on reaction time in block 
1 3  on a trial by trial basis. This involved conducting five paired sample t-tests, 
comparing the first trial of block 1 3  against every other trial. A Bonferroni adjustment 
was made on the alpha level to control for an increase in Type 1 errors. The results 
showed that there was a significant difference between trial one (M = 1 .93 , SY> = 0.53) 
and trial two (M = 2.62, SD = 1. 1 9), t(47) = 3.99, p< 0.01 , trial one (M = 1 .92, SD = 
0.50) and trial three (M = 2.20, SD = 0 .79), t(49) = 2.39, p<O.O l and trial one (M = 
1 .88, SD = 0 .49) and trial four (M = 2.28, SD = 0.86), t(49) = I.95,p< 0.0 1 . No 
significant difference was found between trial one and trial five, and trial one and trial 
SIX. 
To examine whether trial one was an unusually fast trial, a paired sample t-test 
was conducted in which trial one (M = 1.93 ,  SD = 0.52) was compared to the previous 
trial (i.e. , the last trial of the training phase), (M = 2 .05, SD = 0.83). No significant 
difference was found between these two trials, t(49) 0.99, p> 0.05 . 
The trial averages of both transfer blocks were also plotted to see how well 
they fitted a power function. The parameters of the best fit power function are 
presented in table 2 .  
Table 2 
Parameters of the power function fitted to the Transfer trials. 
Parameters Goodness of fit 
b C R rmsd 
2.79 -0.95 0. 86 0.06 
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The curve fitted the data well, as is evident from the small rmsd and the large 
R2 values. This is seen in figure 5, whereby the mean trial averages are plotted, along 
with the best fit power function. This shows that while only the first three trials of 
block one following the context change are significantly slower then the trial prior to 
the change, there is a gradual return of performance across both the transfer blocks. 
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Figure 5. Mean reaction times for each trial with a power function fitted. 
Discussion 
Examining Figure 4 shows the means for each block plotted along with a 
learning curve which was fitted to the first 12 blocks, and the predicted learning curve 
for the two transfer blocks. A marked disruption on block 13 is evident. This is the 
first block in which the participants encountered the context change, and the results 
revealed this block was significantly disrupted. This disruption means the 
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participant's reaction times slowed significantly, supporting the results obtained by 
Johnson (2005) and Speelman and colleagues (2001, 2004). 
The finding of the disruption at the block level in itself contradicts both 
Anderson's and Logan's predictions regarding skill transfer. As both the training task 
and transfer task were being measured on the same items, Anderson would theorise 
that the same productions would be employed, resulting in complete transfer. This 
would be the same outcome predicted by instance theory, as Logan would posit that 
due to the identical problems, the instances that were created during the training phase 
would be utilised for the transfer problems, resulting in complete transfer. However 
given that the mean reaction time for the first block of transfer was significantly 
slower then the last block of the training phase, yet not as slow as the first block of the 
training phase, this means partial transfer has occmTed. 
Given this finding, further analyses were conducted to examine this disruption 
in more detail, specifically on a trial by trial basis. The aim being to see how this 
disruption is distributed. As each problem involved two components, with the 
multiplication problem always being presented first, the first trial of block 13 was 
used as a point of reference to compare against. the other five trials in the block. This 
is because the contextual change is not presented until the second component of each 
trial, so for the first multiplication problem of block 13, the paiiicipants have yet to 
experience the context change. 
The analysis showed that this disruption is more systemic and broad in nature, 
as the first three trials following the context change were significantly disrupted. The 
first trial was also compared to the previous trial to rule out the notion that trial one 
might have been unusually fast. However no significant difference was found between 
those two trials. As such, these findings discount the notion that the disruption may 
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well have been a 'surprise' effect, whereby the participants quickly regain focus by 
the very next trial. 
This is highlighted by examining Figure 5, whereby the means of each trial 
from both the transfer blocks were plotted, and a power curve function fitted. While 
the first three trials following trial one are significantly slower then this trial, visually 
it is evident that there is a gradual return of performance speed, fmiher reinforcing the 
broad effect. This is also supported by examining the power curve function, which 
provides a good fit with the observed data. 
While the disruption at the block level in itself contradicts both Anderson and 
Logan's theories, the finding that the disruption is broadly distributed presents even 
further issues, as it cannot be discounted as a brief momentarily distraction, instead 
these results suggest a more 'mental set' effect. 
A mental set in this context can be thought of as the cognitive strategies that 
individuals use when solving a paiiicular problem/s (Speelman Forbes & Giesen 
2004: Woltz, Bell, Kyllonen, & Gardner, 1996). This notion stems from research that 
showed when people learn a paiiicular task in a situation that is held constant, 
learning is assisted by this steady environment (Carlson & Yaure, 1990). It is 
theorised that when people can predict the next task, they can employ the processing 
rules that are being held in working memory and as such the task is performed more 
effectively. 
Similarly, when a task is being learnt in a random environment, sldll 
acquisition is hindered as people have to constantly reassess the task requirements, 
which involves interchanging processing rules into working memory. While a random 
task environment hinders skill acquisition, it facilitates sldll transfer as the continual 
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changing of tasks impedes the development of a mental set due to the processing rules 
being constantly changed (Carlson & Y aure, 1990). 
In regard to the present study, the training task was of a particular repetitive 
nature as to promote a given mental set to develop, whereby the participants would 
have expected and predicted the following question. As such, these processing 
components would be kept in working memory in anticipation for the next problem. 
Subsequently, the mental set that would have been developed during the training 
phase would not be appropriate to use for the transfer phase, and would have required 
that the participants reassess the task. 
The process of reassessing the task and engaging different processing rules 
means perfo1mance will be impeded. In the present study this is seen with a sharp 
decline in performance speed, followed by a gradual recovery. It is likely then, using 
the mental set paradigm, that when the participants were exposed to the transfer 
phase, they would have gradually developed a mental set in which those problems 
could be solved. This would have involved a different set of processing components 
being used and stored in working memory, which explains the gradual increase in 
performance for the transfer phase. 
This study also highlights the sensitive nature that contextual change can have 
on a previously learned task. The task was caiTied out in controlled conditions, 
without distractions and with the distractor problems being of a very similar nature to 
the target problems, and yet performance was still significantly disrupted. It is likely 
then, that if this was conducted using more natural settings, the disruption would be 
even larger. Many real world situations involve the transfer of well learned skills with 
only a variation in context. 
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A more salient example of where this could be a f actor is sporting teams who 
practise and develop skills in one location, and then have to play another team in a 
different location. The notion that teams often pe1form better when contextual matters 
are not altered has given rise to phrases such as 'home ground advantage' (Bray, 
Jones, & Owen, 2002). Another more common example may extend to people who 
learn to drive a car in a particular vehicle, and then drive in a different vehicle. While 
the task itself has not changed, as the context has, this may result in some disruption 
in performance which may gradually improve with the development of a new mental 
set. It is also likely that the longer the individual has spent developing a particular 
skill in a given constant context, the more ingrained the mental set, and the larger the 
disruption. 
This notion that the same learned skills can be disrupted by contextual 
changes, and that this disruption is more then a fleeting distraction is incongruent with 
both the ACT* theory and instance theory. Both these theories exclude the role of 
context, and instead view skill acquisition through learning modules or learning 
components that function analogous to a machine; whereby a given input, or learning 
component is employed, and this results in a predictable output. However the results 
of the present study suggest while this description may provide a useful model of skill 
acquisition, if context is not taken into account a comprehensive explanation of skill 
acquisition will be incomplete. 
This means that firstly, transfer performance cannot be predicted on the basis 
of training performance, and secondly that any theory attempting to make such 
predictions would need to take contextual factors into account. As such, further 
research can examine different tasks and their effects on contextual change, as well as 
examine the effects of skill transfer in natural settings. 
Contextual Effects 52 
References 
Anderson, J. R. (1982). Acquisition of cognitive skill. Psychological Review, 89(4), 
369-406. 
Anderson, J. R. (1983). A spreading activation theory of mem01y. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22(3), 261-295. 
Anderson, J. R. (1987). Skill acquisition: Compilation of weak-method problem 
solutions. Psychological Review, 94(2), 192-210. 
Anderson, J.R. (1992). Automaticity and the ACT* theory. American Journal of 
Psychology, 105(2), 165-180. 
Anderson, J. R. (1993). Rules of the Mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Anderson, J. R., Greeno, J. G., Kline, P. K., & Neves, D. M. (1981). Acquisition of 
problem solving skill. In J. R. Anderson (Ed.), Cognitive skills and their 
acquisition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Bray, S. R., Jones, M. V., & Owen, S. (2002). The influence of competition location 
on athletes' psychological states. Journal of Sport Behavior, 25, 231-242. 
Crossman, E. R. F. W. (1959). A theory of the acquisition of speed-skill. Ergonomics 
2, 153-166 
Fitts, P.M., & Posner, M.I. (1967). Learning and skilled performance in human 
performance. Belmont CA: Brock-Cole 
Greig, D., & Speelman, C.P. (1999). Is skill acquisition general or specific? In E. 
Watson, G. Halford, T. Dartnall D. Saddy, and J. Wiles (Eds), Perspectives on 
Cognitive Science: Theories, Experiments, and Foundations. Volume 2. 
Stamford, CT: Ab.lex. 
Johnson, E. L. (2005). Skill acquisition and transfer to contextually different tasks: 
complete,· partial or zero transfer? Unpublished honours thesis, Edith Cowan 
Contextual Effects 53 
University, Perth, Western Australia. 
Kolers, P. A. (1975). Memorial consequences of automatized encoding. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 1 (6) 689-701. 
Logan, G. D. (1988). Toward an instance theory of automatization. Psychological 
Review, 95(4), 492-527. 
Logan, G.D. (1990). Repetition priming and automaticity: Common underlying 
mechanisms? Cognitive Psychology, 22, 1-35. 
Logan, G. D. (1995). The Weibull distribution, the power law, and the instance theory 
of automaticity. Psychological Review, 102(4), 751-756. 
Logan, G. D. (1998). What is learned during automatization? II: Obligatory encoding 
of spatial location. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 24(6), 1720-1736. 
Logan, G. D. (2002). An instance theory of attention and memory. Psychological 
Review, 109(2), 376-400. 
Luchins, A. S. (1942). Mechanization in problem solving: The effect ofEinstellung, 
Psychological Monographs, 54(6), 248. 
Newell, A.,"& Rosenbloom, P. S. (1981). Mechanisms of skill acquisition and the law 
of practice. In J. R. Anderson (Ed.), Cognitive skills and their acquisition. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Speelman, C.P., Forbes, J.D., & Giesen, K. (2004). Performing new tasks with old 
skills: Is prediction possible? Unpublished Manuscript 
Speelman, C.P., & Kirsner, K. (2001). Predicting transfer from training performance. 
Acta Psychologica, 108(3), 247-281. 
Woltz, D.J., Bell, B.G., Kyllonen, P.C., & Gardner, M.K. (1996). Memory for order 
of operations in the acquisition and transfer of sequential cognitive skills. 
Contextual Effects 54 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
22(2), 438-457. 
Contextual Effects 55 
Appendix A 
Information Letter and Info1med Consent 
Participant Information Letter 
The purpose of the following research is to investigate how contextual changes can 
affect previously learnt skills. This research is being conducted by Matthew Parkinson 
under the supervision of Craig Speelman. It has been reviewed by and has received 
clearance from the Faculty of Computing, Health and Science Ethics Committee at 
Edith Cowan University. 
As a potential participant in this study, please read the following: 
1. The study you are about to participate in today will take approximately 30 minutes 
to complete. In this study you will be asked a series of simple number problems which 
will be presented to you on the computer screen. Do not panic if you have not done 
anything like this before as most of the other participants are in the same situation. 
2. Your pmiicipation in this study is voluntary and you may withdraw from the study 
at any time, without penalty, by indicating to the experimenter that you do not wish to 
continue. 
3. Your responses will remain completely confidential and your name will not be 
included in the records. 
If you have any concerns resulting from your participation in this study, please 
contact Craig Speelman on 6304 5724. If you wish to discuss this research with m1 
independent staff member please contact Dianne Mckillop on 6304 5736. 
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Appendix A 
Informed Consent 
I hereby agree that I have read and understood the participant information letter and 
agree to participate in the study outlined. I understand that all information gathered in 
this study will be used for research purposes only, and that my anonymity will be 
protected. I am aware that I may choose to withdraw from this study at any time 
without reprisal, and I can freely ask questions regarding the study. I also understand 
that this project has been reviewed and received clearance through the Faculty of 
Computing, Health and Science Ethics Committee at Edith Cowan University. 
Name: ----------------------------
Signature: ----- ---- - - --- -- - - --- - --
Date: ----------------------------
Contextual Effects 57 
Appendix B 
Mean Block Reaction Times For Training and Transfer (seconds) 
Participant Training 1 Training 2 Training 3 Training 4 Training 5 Training 6 Training 7 
1 5 . 8  4 .27 2.9 1 2 .9 1 2 .53 2 .5 1 .55  
2 5 .03 3 . 94 4 . 1 4  4 . 1 4  2.6 1 3 .68 3 .23 
3 4 .7 2.45 2 . 1 2  2. 1 2  2 .24 1 . 87 1 .67 
4 3 .22 2. 1 4  2 .3 1 2 .3 1 1 .84 1 .7 1 .9 
5 3 .72 4 . 1 1  4 . 1 7  4 . 1 7  2.26 3 .32 2 .63 
6 5 . 8  4 .27 2 .9 1  2 .9 1 2 .53 2 .5 1 .55  
7 5 .42 4 . 1 3  3 .53  3 . 53 2 .6 1 1 .87 2 .47 
8 3 .66 2 . 1 1  2 .52 2.52 2.02 1 . 86 2 . 1 6  
9 2 . 1 9  2 . 1 5  1 .53 1 .53 1 .66 1 .75 1 .66 
1 0  3 .79 2 . 8 1  2.53 2.53 1 . 89 2.09 1 .78 
1 1  3 .43 3 . 8 1 3 .76 3 .76 3 .48 3 .64 3 .28 
12 6 .3  4 .2 2 .75 2 .75 2 .37 2 .32 2 .48 
1 3  2 .32 1 .73 1 .68 1 .68  1 .77 1 .9 1  1 .67 
1 4  1 .25 1 .3 1 . 1 8  1 . 1 8  1 . 1 5  1 .25 1 .25 
1 5  2 .54 2 . 1 7  1 .78 1 .78 1 .79 1 .54 1 .43 
1 6  4 . 1 3  4.66 2.6 2.6 2.29 3 .44 2 .68 
1 7  3 . 1 8  3 .07 3 .82 3 .82 2 .58 2 .52 3 . 1 2 
1 8  4 .02 3 . 4 1  2 .75 2 .75 2 .84 2 .8  2.28 
1 9  2.28 1 .2 1 .53 1 . 53 1 .3 8  1 .04 1 .23 
20 4. 1 1  6.47 4 .5 1 4 .5 1 3 . 76 3 .33  2 . 8 1  
2 1  3 .56 3 . 5 1  2 .88 2 .88 2 .68 2.62 2 .82 
22 8 .01  5 . 1 2  5 .2 1  5 .2 1 4 .42 4.64 3 . 1 7  
23 2.2 1 .29 1 .92 1 .92 1 .7 1 .63 2 .04 
24 2 .67 2 .08 1 . 84 1 .84 1 .7 1  1 .68 1 .47 
25 3 .55  2 .7 2 .33 2 .33 2 .06 2 . 1 3  2.22 
26 3 .08  2.3 2 .68 2 .68 2 .9 1 2 .26 2 .32 
27 6 .25 6 .73 4 . 54 4.54 3 .67 3 . 39  2 .93 
28 2 .97 1 .9 2 . 1 8  2 . 1 8  1 .72 2 .48 2 .32 
29 5 .21  6 . 37  4 . 1 1 4 . 1 1  2 . 0 1  1 .7 2 . 58  
30  4 . 33  2 .7 1 2 . 1 4  2 . 1 4  2.0 1 2.29 2.43 
3 1  2 .98 3 . 1  2.28 2.28 1 .96 2.05 1 .84 
32 2.46 1 .72 1 .66 1 .66 1 .22 1 .77 1 .39  
33  4 .07 4 . 1 8  2 .96 2.96 2.29 2.02 2 . 1 8  
34  2.4 1 .95 1 .66 1 .66 1 .59 1 .47 1 .59 
35 3 . 1 5  2 . 1 7  1 .53 1 .53 1 .54 1 .85 2. 1 7  
36  9.73 6 . 58  3 .45 3 .45 2.67 2 .95 2 .57 
37  4 .4 1  3 .3 3  2.69 2 .69 2 .21 1 .93 2.77 
38 3.6 2 .69 2.47 2 .47 2 .07 1 .93 1 .82 
39 2.7 2.59 2 .7 1 2.7 1 1 . 89 1 .6 1 .8 1 
40 3 .07 4.02 2 .8 1 2 . 8 1  2 1 .78 2.0 1 
4 1  5 .47 7.05 5 .25 5 .25 4 .49 5 .69 3 . 03 
42 1 1 .02 5 .68 6 .02 6 .02 6.46 7 .03 5 .95 
43 8 .05 6.99 7.97 7.97 5 .73 7 .55 7 .98 
44 3 . 1 5  2.73 2 . 1 7 2. 1 7  1 .93 1 .6 1  1 . 5 
45 6.96 2.3 1 1 . 83 1 . 83 2 .59 1 .93 1 .54 
46 5 3 .49 3 .05 3 .05 3 . 35  3 .05 3 .09 
47 2.7 2. 1 8  1 .89 1 . 89 1 .69 1 .7 1 .5 
48 1 .9 1  l.96 1 .76 1 .76 1 .63 1 .83 1 .59  
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49 3 .96 2.5 1 2.99 2.99 2.67 2.34 2.32 
50 3 . 1 3  2.49 2.23 2.23 1 .86 2 1 .88 
5 1  1 2. 1 5  6. 1 5  · 4.89 4.89 4.06 3 .64 4.32 
52 2.86 2. 1 2 2 1 .89 2.04 1 .82 
53 6 .04 5 .77 4.97 4 .97 3 . 1 2  2.66 2.96 
54 6.92 5 .56 3 .71 3 .71 4.78 3 .9 4.4 1 
55  2.6 1 2.56 2.21 2.21 2.29 1 .98 2.54 
56 3 .4 2.55 2. 16  2 . 16  1 .54 2.09 1 .73 
57 3 .83 4.67 3 .49 3 .49 2.82 2.36 2.39 
58 2.27 1 .77 1 .9 1 .9 1 .95 1 .98 1 .78 
59 4.39 4.09 5 5 5.77 5 .74 5 . 1 7  
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Appendix B 
Mean Block Reaction Times For Training and Transfer (seconds) 
)articipant Training 8 Training 9 Training 10  Training 1 1  Training 12 Transfer 13 Transfer 14  
1 2. 1 1 .65 1 .74 1 .83 1 .72 4 1 .67 
2 3 .01  3 . 1 4  2.3 2.7 2.36 2.3 2.35 
3 2 . 19  1 .96 2.86 1 .98 1 .94 2 .26 1 .87 
4 2 . 12  1 . 8 1  1 .63 1 .59 1 . 8 1  1 .82 1 .72 
5 2.69 1 .77 1 .7 2.58 1 .74 1 .87 1 .82 
6 2. 1 1 .65 1 .74 1 .83 1 .72 4 1 .67 
7 2.55 1 .73 2. 1 5  2.38 2.41 2.21 2.66 
8 2.92 2.2 2.58 1 .6 1 .85 2. 19  2 . 1  
9 1 .87 1 .55 2.08 1 .58 1 .85 1 .61  1 .82 
10  (56 1 .83 2.25 2.05 2.33 2.6 1 .82 
1 3 .34 3.3 2.84 3 .09 2.96 3 . 1 8  3 .22 
12  2.22 2. 16  2. 1 1 .91  1 .87 2.36 1 .98 
13 1 .64 1 .8 1  1 .64 1 .73 1 .59 1 .7 1 .62 
14  1 .2 1  1 . 1 5 1 .27 1 . 1 3  1 . 14 1 .28 1 .2 
1 5  1 .46 1 .54 1 .64 1 .8 1 .48 1 .67 1 .57 
16 2 . 19  2.37 2.6 2 . 16  2.57 2.64 3 .03 
17  2 . 16  1 .83 1 .66 1 .79 1 .82 2.48 1 .93 
1 8  2. 1 3  2.45 4.2 2.26 2 . 1  2.66 2.49 
19  1 . 1 2  0.98 1 .33 1 .05 1 .24 1 .43 1 .28 
20 1 .97 1 .8 2.04 2.34 2.05 3 . 1 2  2 .5 
2 1  2.6 2.86 2.57 2.52 2.73 3 .61  3 . 1 1  
22 3 .73 4 . 1 9  5 .64 3.33 4.59 3 .89 4.46 
23 1 .56 1 .77 1 .5 1 .65 1 .68 1 .48 1 .65 
24 1 .4 1  1 .48 1 .62 1 .52 1 .52 1 .89 1 .55 
25 2 . 13  1 .82 1 .9 1  1 .87 1 .52 2.2 1 .83 
26 1 .83 2.33 2.42 2.66 2.57 2.36 2. 1 8  
27 3 .35 2.95 3 .06 3 .27 5.03 3 .85 2.3 
28 2.23 1 .67 1 .66 2.73 1 .97 1 .83 1 .78 
29 1 .96 3 .03 2.07 1 .8 1  2.57 2.48 1 .97 
30 2.33 1 .98 2.09 2.04 2.03 2.42 2.65 
3 1  1 .79 1 .93 2 .1 1 1 .84 2.02 1 .9 1 .87 
32 1 .6 1  1 .6 1  1 .58 1 .54 1 .45 1 .6 1  1 .46 
33 2.08 1 .99 1 .73 1 .48 1 .91  1 .75 2.57 
34 1 .88 1 .62 1 .97 1 .71  1 .54 2.03 1 .54 
35 2. 1 9  1 .68 1 .52 1 .92 2 . 1 3  2.23 2 . 1 3  
36 2.27 1 .83 1 .74 4.36 2.39 2.34 2.09 
37 1 .48 1 .88 1 .53 2 .2 1 .96 2.79 2.83 
38 2.58 1 .69 1 .9 2.29 2.0 1 2.28 2.05 
39 1 .9 1  1 .05 1 .23 1 .93 1 .36 1 .35 1.57 
40 2.22 2 .63 2.99 2.84 2.49 1 .89 2.56 
4 1  5.83 5 . 1 3  5.45 2.72 5.78 5 . 1 8  3 .44 
42 4.84 7.25 4.58 4.27 3 .67 5 . 1 9  4.54 
43 8 . 17  7 . 13  10.79 8.76 7.89 2.34 
44 1 .76 1 .48 1 .54 1 .4 1 .26 1 .45 1.39 
45 1 .8 1 .9 1 .67 2.07 1 .7 1 .9 1  1 .99 
46 3 .8 1 2.89 3.23 2.79 3 . 1 8  4.09 3 .72 
47 1 .54 1 .4 1 .43 1 .3 1  1 .24 1.46 1 .62 
48 1 .55 1 .41 1 .49 1 .47 1 .32 1 .61 1 .6 
49 1 .92 1 .93 2. 1 8  2.33 1 .77 2 .87 1 .67 
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50 1 .74 1 .86 1 .97 1 .68 1 .84 1 .78 1 .86 
5 1  3 .5  3 . 16 4. 14  4.26 2.79 3 . 12 3 .29 
52 2.5 1 .88 2.04 1 .8 1  1 .74 1 .75 1 .78 
53 3 .32 3 .78 3.37 3 .01  2.87 2.82 3 . 1 9  
54 4.24 4.54 3.34 3.98 4.06 2.96 4.38 
55 2.73 2.55 2.72 2.71 2.56 2.87 3 .29 
56 1 .7 2. 17  1 .73 2.05 1 .63 2.03 2.03 
57 2 . 19  2.2 4.55 2.22 2.79 3 .42 3 .27 
58 2.2 2.34 1 .84 1 .75 1 .44 1 .98 2.24 
59 4.99 6. 15  3.24 5. 1 4  3 .7 5 .62 4.06 
Blanks indicate outliers. 
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Mean Reaction Times for Transfer Trials (seconds) 
Participant Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 
1 1 .59 1 .23 
2 2 . 1 3  2.77 3 .05 2 . 1 4  1 .87 1 .79 
3 3 . 3 1 2.08 1 .42 2. 1 4  2.77 1 .9 
4 1 .68  2.02 2. 1 5  1 .79 1 . 8 1 .49 
5 1 .52 2.5 1 .67 1 .54 1 .94 2.04 
6 1 .59  1 .23 
7 2 .33 1 .72 1 .93 3 .5 1 1 . 39  2 . 37  
8 1 .3 1  2 .38 2 .49 1 .49 1 .82 3 . 62 
9 1 .47 1 .85  1 .72 1 .4 1 .7 1 .57 
1 0  2 .5 3 .98 2 .36 2 .52 1 .85  2 .34 
1 1  2 .54 3 .54 3 .9 2 .86 3 .54 2.72 
1 2  2.69 2 .58  2.07 1 .7 2 .45 2 .66 
1 3  1 .42 1 .85 1 . 85  1 .85 1 . 75 1 .5 1  
1 4  1 .6 1  1 1 .23 1 . 1 9 1 .44 1 . 1 9  
1 5  1 .53 2 .09 1 .77 1 .87 1 .4 1 .3 5  
1 6  2 .42 3 . 0 1  2 . 5  3 1 .88  3 . 0 1  
1 7  1 .66 4.74 2. 1 2  2 . 1 2  2.09 2. 1 4  
1 8  2 .02 4.2 2.83 2 .66 1 .9 2 . 35  
1 9  1 .42 1 .72 1 .25 1 . 1 3  1 .3 8  1 .64 
20 2.25 3 .69 1 .6 1 3 . 7 1  4 . 35  
2 1  2 .88 3 2.94 3 . 58  3 . 1 1  
22 1 .55 4 .57 3 .68 2.89 2.52 
23 0.96 2.06 1 . 1 8  2 .5 1 .27 0 . 89 
24 1 .55  1 .76 2 . 1 6  2 . 1 1  1 .8 1 .95 
25 1 .78 1 .92 2.57 2 .55  2.3 5 2 
26 1 . 88 3 .58  2 .42 2 2 .38 1 .9 1  
27 1 .69 3 .83 4 .32 3 . 1 9  
28 2 .78 1 .44 1 .5 1  2. 1 8  1 . 1 1  1 .84 
29 2 .2 1 2.56 2 .53 2.08 1 .76 3 .7 1  
30  2 .39 3 .39 2.2 1 2 .79 2.07 1 .65 
3 1  1 .67 2.49 2 .8 1 1 .56 1 .74 1 .73 
32 1 . 1 7  1 .42 1 .46 1 .84 2 . 1 2  1 .63 
33 1 .49 1 .52 2 .2 1  1 .97 1 .57 
34 2 .33  3 .59  1 .8  1 .4 1  1 .46 1 .5 3  
3 5 2.03 1 .39  1 .94 2.09 2.59 3 . 3 5  
36  1 .4 1  2 .27 1 .3 5  1 . 85  
37 2 .35 3 .28 2.9 2 .33 3 .06 
38 1 .97 3 .0 1  1 . 89 1 .84 2.24 2 .64 
39  1 . 1 3  1 .3 8  1 .75 1 .26 1 .24 
40 1 .46 1 .98 2 .35 1 .77 
4 1  7.47 4.26 3 .04 3 .05 
42 1 . 8 1 .9 2 . 1 7  
43 1 .69 
44 1 .3 3 1 .47 1 .26 1 .57  1 .88 1 . 1 9  
45 1 .69 2.98 1 .7 1 .84 1 .82 1 .46 
46 1 .93 4 .23 1 .8 3 .3 3  3 .63 
47 1 .7 1  1 .47 1 .5 1 .4 1 .23 
48 l .43 1 .99 1 .52 1 . 87 1 .25 
49 1 . 54 3 . 1 8  1 .39  2 .28 2 .25 
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50 1 .74 1 .7 1 .77 2.02 1 .76 1 .7 1  
5 1  1 .96 4.36 2.7 3.35 3 .25 
52 1 .82 1 .68 1 .73 1 .5 1 .74 2.01 
53 2.82 2.77 2.49 4. 1 1  1 .92 
54 2.59 2.73 4.02 2.75 2.75 
55 2.32 3 . 1 1 3 .09 2.93 3.37 2.4 
56 2.69 2.38 3 1 .83 1 .2 1 .08 
57 2. 1 5  4.53 2.97 2.72 1 .7 6.45 
58 1 .75 1 .2 1  1 .5 1  3 .88 2.09 1 .42 
59 3 .04 1 .7 1  1 .77 
Blanks indicate incon-ect responses. 
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Mean Reaction Times for Transfer Trials (seconds) 
Participant Trial 7 Trial 8 Trial 9 Trial 1 0  Trial 1 1  Trial 12 
1 2.58 1 .67 1 .48 1 .59 1 .35  1 .37 
2 1 .82 3 .5  2.75 1 .98 2.08 1 .96 
3 1 .83 1 .56 1 .8 1  1 .34 2.64 2.04 
4 1 .66 1 .64 1 .76 1 .83 
5 1 .77 1 .75 2.06 1 .8 1 .65 1 .88 
6 2.58 1 .67 1 .48 1 .59 1 .35  1 .37 
7 1 .6 1  3 . 1 9  2 .51  1 .64 3 .92 3 .06 
8 1 .89 1 .69 2.87 1 .73 2.55 1 .89 
9 1 .44 1 .53 1 .79 1 .37 1 .7 1  3 . 1 1  
1 0  1 .68 1 .92 1 .47 1 .73 1 .93 2.22 
1 1  4.5 1 2.67 2.53 3 .5 3.34 2.79 
12  1 .66 2.47 1 .6 1  2.55 1 .74 1 .85 
1 3  1 .65 1 .65 1 .44 1 .71 1 .72 1 .54 
1 4  1 . 1 6  1 .3 1  0.99 1 .4 1  1 .24 1 .05 
1 5  1 .27 1 .66 1 .47 1 .88 1 .49 1 .77 
16  3 .54 1 .86 1 .87 2 . 1  2.08 
1 7  1 .99 2. 13 1 .64 2.2 1 .78 1 .87 
1 8  2.52 1 .9 1 . 8 1  2.22 4.3 1 2 . 16  
19  1 .06 1 .04 1 .43 1 .64 1 .22 
20 3 .25 2.06 2.22 2.57 2.8 1 2.09 
2 1  2 3.96 3 .22 2.35 3 . 1 1  4.04 
22 3 .65 2 . 17  1 .92 2.5 
23 1 .72 2.26 0.96 1 .07 0.98 2.07 
24 1 .68 1 .6 1 .6 1  1 .3 1 .68 1 .42 
25 1 .69 1 .7 1 .94 2.07 1 .75 
26 2.35 2.23 2.66 1 .75 2.07 2.01 
27 2.87 2.21 
28 1 .89 2.07 1 .08 1 .49 2.21 1 .25 
29 2.04 1 .73 1 .99 2 . 12  2.08 1 .86 
30 1 .73 3 .28 2.65 2.5 3 .09 
3 1  1 .89 1 .94 1 .85 1 .92 1 .73 1 .88 
32 1 .69 1 .34 1 .25 . 1 .79 1 .54 1 . 1 6  
33 2.05 2.23 3 .07 3 . 1 3  1 .48 3.43 
34 2.04 1 .69 1 . 1 3  1 .4 1  1 .43 1 .54 
35  1 .92 1 .6 2.94 3 .59 1 .33 1 .4 
36 1 .59 3 .25 1 .95 1 . 7  1 .82 2.25 
37 2.82 3.63 2.04 
38 1 .73 2.08 2.33 1 .83 2,63 1 .7 
39 0.97 1 .3 0.98 1 .36 3 . 1 2  1 .69 
40 2 . 14  2.97 2. 14  2.09 1 .47 
4 1  3 .03 2.06 4.37 3 2.7 
42 2.87 2.27 1 .9 
43 3 .6 
44 1 .6 1  1 .26 1 .26 1 .37 1 .63 1 .25 
45 2.09 1 .47 2.8 1 .61  
46 2.07 3 3 .66 2 . 13  
47 1 .4 1  1 .3 1  2.61 1 .44 1 .32 
48 . 1 .54 2.33 1 .54 1 .57 1 .35  1 .29 
49 1 . 1 5  2.29 1 .54 1 .7 1  
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50 1 .62 2.28 2.07 1 .59 1 .88 1 .75 
5 1  2.85 2.84 2.08 3.87 
52 1 .87 1 .66 1 .85 1 .87 1 .57 1 .87 
53 2.69 5 .21 2.26 1 .78 2.75 
54 3 .68 2.44 1 .96 
5 5  2.61 1 .8 1  2.2 3 .04 2 . 16  
56  2.79 1 .93 1 .62 2.61 1 .98 1 .24 
57 2 . 17  3.54 2.35 1 .6 1  2 .81 
58 2.88 1 .59 1 .62 3 .62 1 .88 1 .85 
59 2.47 1 .8 1  2.42 2.05 
Blanks indicate incorrect responses. 
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Curve Fitting Data for Block Mean Reaction Times. 
Block Mean Predicted Mean Residuals 
1 4 .29 4 . 1 1 0 . 1 8  
2 3 .45 3 .45 0 
3 2.95 3 . 12 -0. 1 7  
4 2.69 2.9 -0 .2 1 
5 2 .55  2 .74 -0. 1 9  
6 2 . 58  2.62 -0.04 
7 2.45 2 . 52 -0.07 
8 2 .47 2 .44 0 .03 
9 2 .4 2 .36 0.04 
1 0  2 .49 2.3 0 . 1 9  
1 1  2 .38 2.25 0 . 1 3  
1 2  2 .33 2 .2 0. 1 3  
1 3  2 . 57 2 . 1 5  0 .42 
1 4  2.3 1 2 . 1 1  0 .2 
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Curve Fitting Data for Trial Mean Reaction Times (Transfer phase). 
Trial Mean Predicted Mean Residuals 
2 2.67 2 .53 0 . 1 4  
3 2.25 2.39 -0 . 1 4  
4 2.29 2.3 -0 .0 1  
5 2 . 1 7  2.23 -0 .06 
6 2 . 1 7  2 . 1 7  0 
7 2. 1 1  2 . 1 3  -0.02 
8 2 . 1 2  2.09 0.03 
9 2 .02 2.05 -0.03 
1 0  2.07 2.02 0.05 
1 1  2.02 2 0 .02 
12 2.0 1 1 .97 0.04 
